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Contributions of U.S. Crop Subsidies
to Biofuel and Related Markets
Stephen Devadoss and Jude Bayham
The U.S. crop subsidies provide incentives for farmers to expand feedstock production, which
benefits the biofuel producers by lowering input costs. This study develops a general equi-
libriummodeltoanalyzetheeffectsofareductionintheU.S.cropsubsidyonbiofuelindustries
and social welfare. The impacts of feedstock policies on the biofuel market are marginal. In
contrast, the biofuel mandate has a larger impact and counteracts the effects of the crop subsidy
reduction. The mandate increases the demand for feedstock and causes not only grain ethanol,
but also cellulosic ethanol production to rise. The mandate exacerbates the distortion, and
government spending increases significantly, leading to greater welfare loss.
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The U.S. government has supported the de-
velopment of biofuel production not only to
solve the energy crisis, but also to increase the
income of agricultural producers (Hayes et al.,
2009). Farmers benefit from growing feed-
stocks such as corn and oilseed, which are in-
puts in biofuel production, because the higher
demand for these crops increases prices and
incomes. As the biofuel refining process has
become more specialized, corn and soybeans
have emerged as the dominant feedstock be-
cause of a well-established infrastructure for
processing them and historically low prices
until recently. Currently, there are five federal
policies that have significant impacts on bio-
fuel and related industries: biofuel tax credit,
biofuel mandate, ethanol import tariff, gasoline
excise tax, and crop subsidies.
1
The literature on biofuels in the past decade
has been rich and voluminous. In a recent study,
Kim, Schlaible, and Daberkow (2010) present
a rigorous theoretical analysis to examine the
effects of tax credits and binding mandates on
blended gasoline, conventional gasoline, and
ethanol prices. Their results show that an in-
crease in tax credits lowers all three fuel prices,
but a larger blending mandate puts an upward
pressure on all three fuel prices. Harrison (2009)
observes that growth in biofuel production con-
tributed to higher corn prices, which led to price
inflation of corn-based food items such as eggs,
poultry, pork, beef, and milk.
2 Several other
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 2010 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationstudies analyzed the effects of the ethanol tax
credit and mandate (de Gorter and Just, 2009b;
Eidman, 2007), import tariffs and tax credits
(de Gorter and Just, 2008; Elobeid and Tokgoz,
2008), tax credit and farm subsidy interaction
(de Gorter and Just, 2009a; de Gorter, Just, and
Tan, 2009; Gardner, 2003; Hochman, Sexton,
and Zilberman, 2008). de Gorter, Just, and Tan
(2009) also emphasize the need to isolate the
effects of the farm policy on ethanol and gas-
oline markets. This study incorporates all of the
five biofuel-related policies in a general equi-
librium model and focuses on the contribution
of the farm subsidy by analyzing its impacts on
biofuel and allied industries and social welfare.
In doing so, this study internalizes the exter-
nality by incorporating the environmental dam-
age of fuel use into the utility function. Because
fuel is widely used in almost all sectors of the
economy, a general equilibrium analysis is un-
dertaken to capture the interlinkages and policy
repercussions on various markets.
3
There are many complex farm support pro-
grams designed to provide aid to agricultural
producers. Since the Uruguay Round in 1994,
the U.S. has adjusted farm support programs to
comply with World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules by limiting the price distorting subsidies
that affect producers’ planting decisions. The
1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and
Reform Act decoupled farm subsidies, thereby
disconnecting government payments from
market prices in any given year (Lamb and
Henderson, 2000). The agricultural economics
literature has focused on whether decoupled
payment programs do in fact impact commodity
prices and production decisions. Bhaskar and
Beghin (2009) summarized an array of litera-
ture that focuses on the empirical evidence
from the past 15 years and concluded that
decoupled payment programs do affect pro-
ducers’ planting and acreage decisions. More-
over, the 2008 Farm Bill, in contrast to the goal
of the Doha Round, expanded the farm sup-
ports, which was one of the causes for the
continued breakdown in the negotiations as the
developing countries and also some developed
counties (e.g., Canada) insist that the U.S. lower
its agricultural subsidies for successful comple-
tion of the Doha Round. Given the importance
of agricultural subsidies to augment production,
it is worth examining the effects of crop subsidy
reduction on feedstock, biofuel, and related mar-
kets and the overall social welfare.
Numerous studies across a variety of disci-
plines have extensively examined the environ-
mental impacts and economic feasibility of
biofuels. Studies such as Patzek et al. (2005)
and Pimentel (1991, 2003) contend that despite
improvements in biofuel refining efficiency,
the energy expended to produce biofuel ex-
ceeds the energy derived from biofuel. Liska
et al. (2009) and Shapouri, Duffield, and Wang
(2002) argue that earlier studies use outdated
data and do not consider emergingtechnologies
in biofuel production. The most recent envi-
ronmental literature focuses on the inclusion
of global land use impacts in the calculation of
net emissions (Naylor and Mendelsohn, 2007;
Searchinger et al., 2008). The estimates repor-
ted in these papers are used by other studies to
determine externality and welfare impacts. The
significant variation in these estimates results
in a wide range of conclusions. The current
study accounts for thevariation in the estimates
by considering three pollution assumptions
(biofuels reduce greenhouse gas [GHG] emis-
sions, biofuels emit less GHG than petroleum,
and biofuels emit more GHG than petroleum).
Theoretical Analysis
This section describes the structure of the gen-
eral equilibrium model consisting of a represen-
tative household, production markets, a govern-
ment sector, and a trade sector (see Taheripour,
Khanna,andNelson,2008fora similarstructure
of a general equilibrium model). The model also
incorporates biofuel-related policies and envi-
ronmental damages of fuel pollution. Then, the
model is used to derive the analytical results.
Household Sector
The representative household derives utility
from the consumption of final fuel GD ðÞ , which
3Goulder and Williams (2003) note that the use of
a partial equilibrium model may underestimate the
social cost of government policies because they ne-
glect tax interaction effects.
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feedstock FD ðÞ ,andacompositegood YD ðÞ .T h e
pollution Z ðÞgenerated from the use of fuel
causes disutility. The utility function is given by
U5uG D,FD,YD,ZG D ðÞ ðÞ .
The representative household receives income
from the endowments of land  R ðÞ , capital  K ðÞ ,
and labor  L ðÞ , and government transfers GT ðÞ ,
and all the income is spent on consumption
goods. Thus, the budget constraint is
rR  R1rK  K 1w L1GT5PC
GGD 1PC
FFD 1YD,
where rR is the land rental rate, rK is the
capital rental rate, w is the wage rate, PC
G is the
consumer price of final fuel, and PC
F is the
feedstock price paid by consumers or biofuel
producers. The composite good is considered
as the numeraire, and hence, all other prices are
measured in terms of the composite good price.
The representative household maximizes utility
subject to the budget constraint and considers












rR  R1rK  K 1w L1GT5PC
GGD 1PC
FFD 1YD,
where the Lagrange multiplier l represents the
marginal utility of income.
Production Sector
The production sector is comprised of the feed-
stock, biofuel, petroleum, final fuel, and com-
posite good markets. Production functions for
all thesegoods are assumedtobe constantreturns
to scale. The feedstock is produced using land
RF ðÞ , capital KF ðÞ ,a n dl a b o r LF ðÞ . The govern-
ment subsidizes feedstock production and the
per-unit subsidy is SO. The profit maximization
condition with the inclusion of farm subsidy is:
(1) PC
F5MCF rR,rK,w ðÞ   SO,
where MC stands for marginal cost. Producers
receive a price PP
F
  
, which is equal to MC and
thus to the consumer/market price plus the
subsidy. This representation of price relation-
ship incorporating U.S. crop subsidies follows
the studies by Devadoss and Luckstead (2010)
and Luckstead, Devadoss, and Rodriguez (2010).
The feedstock market-clearing condition states
that feedstock supply FS ðÞ is equal to feedstock
used for food consumption FD ðÞ , biofuel pro-
duction FB ðÞ ,a n de x p o r t s FX ðÞ :
(2) FS5FD 1FB 1FX.
The biofuel producers use feedstock, labor LB ðÞ ,
and capital KB ðÞ to produce biofuel. The result







B is the producer price of biofuel.
Blenders receive a tax credit tcB ðÞ for using
biofuel with petroleum to produce the final fuel
and pass along part of the tax credit to biofuel
producers, which causes a pricewedge between




price. This price relationship is:
(4) PC
B5PP
B   tcB.
Imported biofuel also avails this tax credit. Be-
cause the U.S. government’s policy aims to
subsidize only domestic biofuel production, it
imposes a tariff tB ðÞ to counteract the tax credit.





B is the world price of biofuel. The
market clearing condition for biofuel is:
(6) BS 1BM5BD,
where BS is domestic supply of biofuel, BM is
imports of biofuel, and BD is domestic use of
biofuel.
Petroleum/fossil fuel is produced using
capital KO ðÞ and labor LO ðÞ . The profit maxi-
mization yields:
(7) PO5MCOðrK,wÞ,
where PO is thepetroleum price. The petroleum
market equilibrium is given by the identity sup-
ply OS ðÞ plus imports OM ðÞ equal demand OD ðÞ :
(8) OS 1OM5OD.
The final fuel is produced by blending biofuel
with petroleum. The first-order condition of the
profit maximization is:




G is the producer price of the final fuel.








The final fuel is not traded
4 and thus the market
clearing condition is:
(11) GS5GD.
The final market of the production sector is the
composite-good market Y ðÞ , which is produced
using land RY ðÞ , capital KY ðÞ , and labor LY ðÞ .
The profit maximization leads to:
(12) PY5MCY rR,rK,w ðÞ ,
where PY is theprice ofthecompositegood and
equal to one because the composite good is the
numeraire. The composite-good market equilib-
rium states that supply YS ðÞ is equal to the sum
of domestic demand YD ðÞ and exports YX ðÞ :
(13) YS5YD 1YX.
The factor-market equilibriums for land, capi-
tal, and labor are given by the identity that the
endowments are equal to uses in the production
of various goods:
(14)  R5RF 1RY
(15)  K5KF 1KB 1KO 1KY
(16)  L5LF 1LB 1LO 1LY.
Government Sector
Thegovernment collects revenues from the fuel
tax and import tariff and spends them on farm
subsidies, biofuel tax credits, and transfers.
5
Thus, the government budget constraint is:
(17) tGGD 1tBBM5SOFS 1tcBBD 1GT.
The government balances the budget by adjust-
ing the transfers in response to changes in the
revenues and expenditures.
Trade Balance
The trade balance constraint is given by the
identity that the value of exports of feedstock
and composite good is equal to the value of





To analyze the effects of feedstock subsidies,
totally differentiate the utility function with re-

































Before the current recession, high fuel con-
sumption had stimulated the demand for biofuel
and the mandate requirement was nonbinding.
However, as a result of the recession, fuel
demand declined, resulting in reduced demand
for biofuel also. Yet, domestic fuel blenders
were subject to the same volumetric require-
ment and the biofuel use may not exceed this
mandated volume. In this case, the mandate
becomes binding. Because the mandate has
differing impacts and policy implications, it is
important to analyze the effects of farm sub-
sidies under both the binding and nonbinding
mandates.
Nonbinding Mandate. To analyze the effects
of an agricultural subsidy reduction on wel-
fare, the price relationships (Equations [1],
[3], [4], [5], [7], [9], [10], and [12]), market
equilibrium conditions (Equations [2], [6],
[8], [11], and [13]), full employment condi-
tions (Equations [14], [15], and [16]), gov-
ernment budget (Equation [17]), and trade
balance (Equation [18]) are incorporated into
Equation (19), and Shepherd’s lemma is ap-
plied to obtain:
4This assumption is applicable to the U.S. because
the trade in the final fuel that contains the biofuel is not
very significant.
5Other government revenues and expenditures are
held constant in the theoretical analysis and thus
excluded from the government budget constraint.
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ity of the rest of the world excess supply of
petroleum, excess supply of biofuel, and excess
demand of feedstock. A decrease in the subsidy
curtails feedstock production and raises the
feedstock price. As a result, the cost of biofuel
production increases, which reduces biofuel
supply and increases biofuel price. The higher
biofuel price discourages biofuel use, and pe-
troleum is substituted for biofuel in fuel pro-
duction, which impacts the final fuel supply.
Because the general equilibrium framework is
used in the analysis, the repercussions of agri-
cultural support reductions flow through all the
markets, trade, and the government sector of
the economy to eventually impact utility. All of
these effects finally influence consumption and
utility as captured in Equation (20). Each term
in this equation is either welfare enhancing or
reducing, and the net effect is an empirical
question.
The first term is the Pigouvian effect, which
internalizes the externality arising from the
pollution and thus measures the environmental
efficiency. The Pigouvian effect is comprised
of petroleum and biofuel components. In the
‘‘first-best’’ case where no other distortions
exist, the optimal value of the fuel tax is a pure
Pigouvian tax. The petroleum component in-
dicates that the adverse environmental effects
associated with increased use of fossil fuel
resulting from the farm subsidy reduction is
equal to the fuel tax weighted by the petroleum
content in the blend. The biofuel component re-
veals that the beneficial or detrimental (depend-
ing on whether biofuel reduces or augments
pollution) environmental effects of a decrease in
biofuel, as a result of the cut in the farm subsidy,
are equal to the fuel tax weighted by the biofuel
content in the blend minus the tax credit. In the
‘‘second-best’’ case, the environmental loss in the
petroleum component reflects the incremental
use of fossil fuel times the difference between
marginal social benefit and marginal social cost.
Similar interpretations of environmental gain/
loss also hold for the biofuel component.
The tariff effect captures the impacts of a
change in biofuel tariff revenues on utility.
Because domestic biofuel production decreases
in response to the cut in farm subsidy, biofuel
imports and tariff revenues rise, which en-
hances welfare. The subsidy effect reflects the
impacts of a change in farm payments on util-
ity. Lower subsidy payments reduce feedstock
production, which leads to a decline in gov-
ernment farm program payments, reduces dis-
tortions, improves production efficiency, and
augments welfare. The trade effects have three
components: petroleum, biofuel, and feedstock.
The effects of these terms on utility depend on
the elasticity of excess supply/demand, which
are generally inelastic. The petroleum trade
effect has two subcomponents. The first sub-
component indicates that the increased demand
for petroleum raises the world price and in-
creases the value of imports, both of which
diminish welfare. The second subcomponent
also has a negative effect on utility because
increased use of petroleum leads to more im-
ports. The explanation for biofuel trade effects
is similar to that of petroleum trade effects. The
first part of the feedstock component has
a positive effect on welfare because the cut in
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of the feedstock component is also welfare-
enhancing as exports are diverted to domestic
use.
BindingMandate.In the U.S., the mandated
use of biofuel is formulated as a consump-
tion mandate, i.e., fixed volume of biofuel
has to be blended with fossil fuel. However,
the Environmental Protection Agency im-
plements it as a blend mandate, i.e., biofuel
and fossil fuel are combined based on a
specified blend ratio. The analysis of farm
subsidy effects was conducted under both
consumption and blend mandates and the
results were similar. Consequently, in the
interest of space limitation, only the analysis
and the results of the consumption mandate
are presented.
When the biofuel mandate is binding,  BD
is predetermined and exogenous to the model.
The fuel blending industry is required to blend
this predetermined volume of biofuel into the
fuel supply. Thus, fuel blenders vary blend
rates by mixing the petroleum and biofuel to
meet the biofuel mandate as well as total fuel
demand. For example, if fuel demand de-
creases, blenders would reduce petroleum
content, whereas biofuel use remained constant
in the fuel supply. Because biofuel demand
 BD ðÞ is exogenous, the biofuel component of
the Pigouvian effect in these equations drops
out, which leads to the following equation:
In the event that the biofuel mandate remains
binding, even with a lower feedstock subsidy,
fuel producers are forced to blend the mandated
volume of biofuel. Thus, fuel production could
be nonoptimal, i.e., isocost line is not tangent to
isoquant. Because a mandated volume of bio-
fuel limits the ability of fuel producers to blend
biofuel and petroleum optimally, less petro-
leum will be used although biofuel price in-
creases. The increased petroleum use worsens
the environmental efficiency as represented in
the petroleum component of the Pigouvian ef-
fect. The tariff effect shows that biofuel imports
increase as the marginal cost of domestic pro-
duction rises as a result of the reduction in the
feedstock subsidy, and the greater tariff revenue
augments utility. The subsidy effect indicates
that lower farm payments improve the pro-
duction efficiency and thus enhancewelfare. The
interpretation of the three components of the
trade effect is similar to that provided in the
nonbinding mandate analysis.
In this analysis of the binding mandate, the
effect of subsidy reduction is carried out at the
pre-existing level of the consumption mandate,
which is similar to the analysis by de Gorter and
Just (2009b). That is why, unlike in Equation
(20), d BD is zero in Equation (21). However, the
effect of an exogenous increase in the mandate
 BD is also relevant because the U.S. govern-
ment has formulated a schedule of higher vol-
umes of biofuel in the fuel mix through 2022.
The effect of this increase in the mandated
volumeof biofuel is carried out in the empirical
analysis.
The Empirical Model
In the theoretical model, many of the com-
modities, except for the feedstock, biofuel,
petroleum, and final fuel, are lumped under the
composite good. To fully capture the impacts
of policy changes on important sectors of the
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market must be expanded to cover all of the
crops and vegetations used in biofuel produc-
tion, and the biofuel market needs to be sepa-
rated to include various forms of biofuel. The
government collects revenues through various
forms of taxes and spends the revenues on
various economic activities, and thus, all public
income and expenditure channels must be
accounted for in the model. The rest of theworld
sector should cover the exports and imports
of all goods. This section identifies important
markets and components of the empirical
model and presents functional forms of key
equations.
6
The empirical model includes 36 commod-
ity markets.
7 The key agricultural commodity
markets covered are corn, grains, oilseed, sugar,
switch grass, crop residue, forest residue, and
livestock. Major ingredients used in the pro-
duction of grain ethanol are corn and other
grains, of sugar ethanol are sugarcane
8 and
sugarbeet, and of cellulosic ethanol are switch
grass,
9 crop residue, and forest residue. Three
forms of ethanol—grain, sugar, and cellulosic—
are combined to produce composite ethanol.
Composite ethanol and fossil fuel are blended
to produce composite gasoline. Oilseeds and
animal waste are major ingredients in biodiesel
production. Biodiesel and diesel are blended to
produce composite diesel. Composite gasoline
and composite diesel are called final fuels,
which are used in various production sectors
and by consumers. The remaining commodity
markets cover other agricultural and manufac-
turing goods.
Commodities are produced using interme-
diate inputs (e.g., seed, fertilizer, processing in-
puts) and primary factors (land, labor, and cap-
ital). Following Lo ¨fgren, Harris, and Robinson
(2002), a two-level production function is used
(also see Perroni and Rutherford, 1998). At the
first level, the aggregate intermediate input and
the quantity of value added of primary inputs
are obtained. Producers use various intermedi-
ate inputs (QINT) in fixed proportions to form
the aggregate intermediate input (QINTA)a s
given by the Leontief function:
QINTca5icaca   QINTAa
where icaca is the constant input requirement
of commodity c used in the production of
commodity a. The constant elasticity of sub-
stitution function defines the value added, i.e.,















where f is the set of factors (land, labor, and
capital), ava
a is the scale parameter, d
va
fa are the
share parameters, which sum to 1, rva
a is related
to the elasticity of substitution, QVA is the
quantity of value added in commodity a, and
QFfa is the quantity of each factor.
At the second level, intermediate inputs and
primary factors are combined in fixed pro-
portion using the Leontief function to produce
the final output (Lo ¨fgren, Harris, and Robinson,
2002). The equation used for determining the
demand for aggregate intermediate inputs is:
QINTAa5intaa   QAa
where QAa is the quantity of commodity a
produced and intaa is the amount of aggregate
intermediate inputs required per unit of output.
The demand for the aggregated quantity of
primary factors (land, labor, and capital) is de-
termined by the equation:
6Detailed documentation of the model including
mathematical equations, variable definitions, and pa-
rameter specifications for all commodity markets,
factor markets, institutions, and the rest of the world
sector are available on request.
7These markets include: oilseeds, grains, corn,
sugar, switchgrass, livestock, other agriculture, crop
residues, forest residues, manufactured byproducts,
distilled dry grain products, glycerin, oil and natural
gas, grain ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, sugar ethanol,
composite ethanol, gasoline, composite gasoline, bio-
diesel, diesel, composite diesel, mining, utility, con-
struction, wet corn milling, soybean and other oilseed
processing, food manufacturing, fertilizers and pesti-
cides, motor vehicle related manufacturing, other
manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, transporta-
tion, pipelines, services, and government industries.
8See Outlaw et al. (2007) for viability of sugarcane
in ethanol production in the U.S.
9See Popp (2007) and Walsh et al. (2007) for the
viability of switch grass and cellulose feedstocks in
ethanol production.
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where ivaa is the amount of value added input
required per unit of output. Household con-
sumption is characterized by a Stone-Geary
utility function.
Data
The data for the base year 2007 was collected
from several sources. The majority of the data
were based on the input–output database from
IMPLAN. The rest of the data are from the U.S.
Department of Commerce (2007) and U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA, 2007). Policy
information was assembled from the Economic
Research Service of the USDA. The data on
various energy sources was obtained from the
Energy Information Administration. In addition
to these data, various elasticity parameters were
collected from the literature. The elasticities of
substitution came from the GTAP-E model de-
veloped by Burniaux and Truong (2002). Export
supply and import demand elasticities were
obtained from Holland, Devadoss, and Stodick
(2005). The pollution emission data from the
GREET (Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emis-
sions, and Energy Use in Transportation) model
developed by the Argone National Labs and
Unnasch and Pont (2007) were used to compute
the marginal external damage of pollution.
Results
The lack of progress in the Doha round nego-
tiations is largely the result of the disagreement
between the developing countries and the de-
veloped countries over the unwillingness of the
latter to reduce farm supports. In particular,
poor countries (generally known as group of 20,
i.e., G-20) led by India and Brazil insist that the
U.S. reduce agricultural subsidies for success-
ful completion of the Doha Round.
10 Further-
more, Canada filed a request for consultation
with the WTO regarding the increase in the
U.S. corn subsidy in the 2008 Farm Bill and
accused the U.S. of selling subsidized corn at
a lower price in the Canadian markets (Canada,
2007). More recently, biofuel proponents have
argued that the additional demand for corn
created by biofuel production will ensure that
prices remain higher than historical averages.
These arguments would call for a reduction in
farm subsidies. However, well-entrenched farm
lobbyists will not let the agricultural subsidy
drop too low because it provides a safety net
to farmers. Therefore, only a modest reduction
of agricultural subsidies is a realistic outcome
to meet the demand of the WTO members. In
this study, an analysis of a 15% reduction in the
agricultural subsidy was conducted under non-
binding and binding mandates. The results of
this scenario are presented in Table 1.
Nonbinding Mandate
As crop subsidies are reduced by 15%, total
corn production falls by 0.66%, which drives
up the consumer price by 0.91%.
11,12 Because
corn is also consumed by households and is the
primary input in grain ethanol production, the
agricultural subsidy reduction impacts the
economy through two principal avenues. First,
household consumption falls by 0.90% and
exports also decline by 0.51%. Second, because
of the higher corn price, less corn is used in
grain ethanol production, which results in a
0.86% decrease in output and a 0.31% increase
in grain ethanol price.
The higher grain ethanol production costs
cause composite ethanol blenders to substi-
tute away from grain ethanol in favor of cel-
lulosic and sugar ethanol. Although cellulosic
ethanol production increases by 0.11% and
sugar ethanol production increases by 2.27%,
these gains are nevertheless overshadowed by
the decrease in grain ethanol output because
10The G-20 countries insist that the U.S. limits its
trade-distorting farm supports to U.S. $13 billion, but
the U.S. wants to cap its support at U.S. $17 billion
(ICTSD, 2007).
11Gardner (2003) also finds impacts of farm pro-
grams on corn production and prices are relatively
small.
12The impacts of 15% reduction in farm subsidy in
our general equilibrium analysis range from modest to
insignificant because the size of the biofuel relative to
the total fuel supply is small and even more so relative
to the overall economy.




Feedstock Industries (percent change)
Corn
Producer price 1.00 0.92 1.63
Production 26,916.69 –0.66 9.83
Consumer price 1.00 0.91 3.89
Consumption 16,459.22 –0.74 14.67
World price 1.00 1.03 –2.39
Exports 9,524.26 –0.51 1.22
Oilseed
Producer price 1.00 –0.03 0.93
Production 21,886.92 0.02 3.56
Consumer price 1.00 –0.02 3.16
Consumption 22,604.38 0.01 3.66
World price 1.00 –0.02 4.24
Imports 10,597.51 0.00 1.04
Fuel industries
Cellulose ethanol
Price 1.00 0.21 7.10
Output 19.34 0.11 11.83
Sugar ethanol
Price 1.00 0.00 –0.01
Output 3.99 2.27 122.32
Grain ethanol
Price 1.00 0.31 2.97
Output 10,907.44 –0.86 65.73
Composite ethanol
Price 1.00 0.28 4.28
Output 11,666.62 –0.81 61.54
World price 0.68 0.15 28.47
Imports 735.84 0.03 6.46
Petroleum
Price 1.00 0.00 –0.27
Output 224,964.35 0.03 –2.21
World price 1.00 0.02 –1.27
Imports 11,160.68 0.00 –0.32
Composite gasoline
Price 1.00 0.01 –1.05
Output 266,298.50 –0.01 0.13
Biodiesel
Price 1.00 –0.02 2.43
Output 1,249.04 0.06 100.00
Diesel
Price 1.00 0.00 –0.27
Output 120,226.02 0.00 –0.44
World price 1.00 0.00 –0.44
Imports 8,230.80 0.00 –0.11
Composite diesel
Price 1.00 0.00 –0.48
Output 128,842.72 0.00 0.18
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the latter. Consequently, composite ethanol
output declines by 0.81%, resulting in a price
increase of 0.28%. As the ethanol price in-
creases, composite gasoline blenders substitute
petroleum for ethanol, thus marginally increasing
petroleum use. This leads to a small increase in
the compositegasoline price and a slight decrease
in the output. A decrease in corn production
makes land available for other agricultural pro-
duction. As a result, oilseed production rises,
which in turn increases the biodiesel production
and lowers the biodiesel price. These changes,
however, are too small to impact diesel and
composite diesel markets.
The lower farm supports lead to a $249
million reduction in corn subsidy payments.
Also, the tax credit payments decline by $12
million as blenders reduce the biofuel in the
fuel mix. The reduction of the distortionary
agricultural crop subsidies has a limited impact
on the economy because of the relatively minor
share of ethanol in the total fuel supply. A 15%
reduction in crop subsidies causes overall
welfare to increase by $99 million as measured
by the equivalent variation. In the first two
pollution options (biofuel (a) reduces GHG and
(b) emits less GHG than fossil fuel), utility de-
clines (not reported in Table 1) because biofuel
in the fuel mix is reduced as a result of the cut in
crop subsidies. In contrast, in the third pollution
option (biofuel emits more GHG than fossil fuel),
utilityincreases becausethebiofueluseis reduced.
Binding Mandate
Simulation is also run to analyze the biofuel
mandate
13 in addition to changes in crop sub-
sidies. Specifically, the model is calibrated to
examine the 2009 ethanol requirement of 10.5




Feedstock Industries (percent change)
Welfare
Household consumption
Corn 9.79 –0.90 –3.77
Livestock 8,949.41 0.01 –0.63
Manufactured food 509,061.42 –0.01 –0.26
Composite gasoline 102,168.20 –0.01 1.03
Composite diesel 9,770.72 0.00 0.45
Factor wages
Labor 1.00 0.00 0.01
Capital 1.00 0.00 0.01
Land 1.00 0.01 4.35
Government cost(–)/revenue(1) ($ millions)
Fuel tax 48,049.00 3.00 –342.00
Tax credit 2,690.00 –12.00 –1,988.00
Import tariff 237.00 0.00 87.00
Corn subsidy 1,685.00 –249.00 86.00
Equivalent variation ($ millions) 98.89 2,708.53
a Prices are measured in real terms and quantities are in million real dollars.
13A computable general equilibrium analysis by
Dicks et al. (2009) showed that the renewable fuel
standard mandates of 36 billion gallons of ethanol
production in 2022 would require 10.9 billion bushels
of grain, 71 million tons of corn stover, and 56,200
tons of switchgrass. Because of this increase in these
feedstock productions, land price would increase by
17.2%. Kenkel and Holcomb (2009) found that to meet
the mandate of 36 billion gallons of ethanol, a capital
investment of more than $100 billion in production
facilities would be needed.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, November 2010 7520.6 billion gallons. Under the binding mandate,
blenders are forced to blend more biofuel into
the fuel supply, thus artificially increasing the
demand for ethanol and feedstock inputs, which
counteracts the agricultural subsidy reduction
impacts discussed in the previous analysis.
When the mandate and a 15% reduction in crop
subsidies are implemented simultaneously, the
impacts of the subsidy reduction are over-
shadowed by the increased biofuel demand
caused by the mandate. This point is imme-
diately evident when comparing the 9.83%
increase of corn production in the binding
mandate case vs. the 0.66% decrease in the
nonbinding case. Furthermore, the consumer
price of corn increases by 3.89%, which is
caused by the increased corn demand for eth-
anol production. Both of these results support
the claims that biofuel policies will provide
much more support than the existing corn sub-
sidy does (Gardner, 2003). Hochman, Sexton,
and Zilberman (2008) also found that biofuel
policies are economically feasible alternatives
to deficiency payments because they sufficiently
increase the demand for feedstock crops, raising
the price above the target price. The binding
mandate also increases the biodiesel demand,
which augments oilseed production (3.56%).
The subsidy reduction and mandate impact
the composite ethanol market most directly be-
cause itgivesthe composite ethanolblendersthe
option to use the least costly form of ethanol
because the three types (cellulosic, sugar, and
grain) of ethanol are chemically identical at the
point of blending. As discussed in the non-
binding mandate analysis, the reduction in the
agricultural subsidy increases the production
cost of grain ethanol. Consequently, composite
ethanol blenders substitute cellulosic and sugar
ethanol for grain ethanol. However, the impact
of the ethanol mandate is so large, this substitu-
tion effect is almost negligible as consumption
of all three forms of ethanol increase (61.54%
for grain ethanol, 11.83% for cellulosic etha-
nol, and 122.32% for sugar ethanol).
14 Ethanol
imports also rise by 6.46% to meet the higher
demand for ethanol under the mandate. The
mandate causes the ethanol content in the
composite gasoline supply to increase to 7.89%
and petroleum content declines to 92.11% (not
reported in Table 1). The mandate also expands
the biodiesel output by 100%, resulting in a
modest decline in diesel use in the composite
diesel mix. Yet, the large increase in biodiesel
supply offsets the fall in diesel use, leading
to a small increase in composite diesel output.
As a result, the biodiesel content in the com-
posite diesel increases to 2.04% and diesel
content decreases to 97.96% (not reported in
Table 1).
Because the increased biofuel used in the
fuel supply receives a tax credit, the price of
composite gasoline falls by 1.05% and price of
composite diesel falls by 0.48%. As fuel be-
comes relatively less expensive, consumers use
more fuel. The mandate leads to greater de-
mand for corn for biofuel production, which
results in an increase in the consumer price of
corn and a decline in the household consump-
tion of corn by 3.77%. Although the 15% cut in
the agricultural subsidy reduces market distor-
tions, the consumption mandate dramatically
increases distortions by forcing the reallocation
of resources. The 4.35% rise in land values il-
lustrates increased demand for land to augment
feedstock production to meet biofuel demands
and also the need for reallocating the farmland
from other food crops.
15 Because of the greater
use of biofuel in the fuel mix, the government
spends an additional $1.99 billion in tax
credit. Furthermore, overall welfare decreases
by $2.7 billion as measured by the equivalent
variation. Finally, increased biofuel use raises
utility in the first pollution option but signif-
icantly reduces utility (25.19% for composite
gasoline and 43.36% for composite diesel)
in the third pollution option (not reported in
Table 1).
14The large increase in sugar ethanol is the result
of the small magnitude of the sugar ethanol production
of the U.S.
15This result is consistent with the findings by
Herndon (2008) and Susanto, Rosson, and Hudson
(2008) that ethanolization expanded corn acreage at
the expense of other crops such as wheat, soybean, and
cotton.
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The U.S. farm subsidies provide incentives for
farmers to expand feedstock production, which
lowers input costs to the biofuel producers. The
biofuel tax credits and mandates increase the
biofuel production, which provides additional
support for farmers by ensuring that demand
for their feedstock crops remain high. Further-
more, biofuel production raises the price of
land values, which augments the wealth of
farmers. The problem with the greater demand
for feedstock became apparent during the food
shortage around the world in 2008 when high
food prices were causing hunger and starvation,
especially in developing nations (de Gorter,
Just, and Tan, 2009).
Although U.S. crop subsidies, by inducing
overproduction of feedstock, benefit both the
farmers and biofuel producers, the WTO mem-
ber countries are insisting that the U.S. drasti-
cally reduce its farm supports for successful
completion of the Doha Round. However, the
U.S.iswillingtoreduce itsfarmsubsidybyonly
a modest amount. Consequently, this study
examines the effects of a 15% reduction in the
U.S. farm subsidy on biofuel, gasoline, feed-
stock, food, and factor markets, government
costs, pollution, and welfare. The impact of the
cut in subsidies on the feedstock market is to
decrease production and increase price. The
increase in feedstock prices would make first-
generation biofuels less competitive, providing
a further incentive for advanced biofuels such
as cellulosic ethanol. The decline in subsidy
payments leads to less distortion and a welfare
increase. However, the impacts of feedstock
policies on fuel prices are very small, which is
a direct result of the relative size of the in-
dustry, i.e., the biofuel component of the final
fuel is relatively small, and in relation to the
overall economy, it is insignificant.
The mandate requires the blenders to use
more biofuel, which results in more pronounced
impacts.Furthermore, theeffectsofthe mandate
counteract and dominate the effects of the crop
subsidy reduction. Under the mandate scenario,
demand for feedstock increases, which causes
production to rise. In addition, other ethanol pro-
duction also increases. Unlike the farm subsidy
reduction scenario, the mandate exacerbates the
distortion, and government spending increases
significantly, leading to greater welfare loss.
[Received January 2010; Accepted June 2010.]
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